Questions / Question 06
Question 06, Operations path
What happens to our tokenised collateral if the platform goes down?
For operations, custody and collateral leads at a bank, asset manager or clearing house who have to tell a risk committee what happens to posted collateral and client assets when a tokenisation platform or ledger is unavailable, and what the fallback is.
The short answer
Partly. For a clearing house the bar is already written down: EU rules set a two hour maximum recovery time objective and a secondary site with a distinct geographical risk profile. What no rule yet sets is how a tokenised arrangement meets it.
Start with what the bar already is. For a clearing house, EU rules make the business continuity policy name the maximum acceptable time critical functions can be unusable, require testing against a two hour maximum recovery time objective, and require a secondary processing site with a geographical risk profile distinct from the primary one. Claims 26, 27 and 28.
Nobody has written the tokenised version of that yet. ESMA frames the key question as whether a tokenised collateral arrangement reaches an outcome at least equivalent to today’s, including well-defined fallback arrangements, and it’s asking the market what testing, assurance and scenario analysis that would take. It treats any component whose failure would stop a clearing house using collateral as a critical dependency. Claims 1, 2, 5 and 9.
What the sources do settle is where the fallback lives. Where the token is a twin of an asset held in a custody or depository chain, ESMA says the asset stays safe but the outage can still stop you mobilising it, and the route to using or selling it after a default runs through those custodial systems. Where the token is the asset itself, a disruption can block transfer or use even where the asset remains valid. Claims 3, 4 and 7.
The one service we can read in detail works that way. In what DTC described to SEC staff, the official record of tokenized entitlements is DTC’s own off-chain system, and the securities stay registered to DTC’s nominee throughout. DTC also says it gives those entitlements no collateral value and no settlement value in its own risk controls. Claims 21 and 22.
The supervisors and the industry are circling the same gap. The FCA says recent incidents have shown significant operational resilience risks in decentralised infrastructure, and that a firm using third-party technology still carries the outcome itself. The FIA wants contingency arrangements that keep collateral reachable through outages. ISDA and GDF want guidance on resilience for custody, and warn that losing a private key can be irreversible. Claims 13, 14, 18, 19 and 20.
Canton is the worked case here, because the question doesn’t name a network and Canton publishes its recovery procedure. Its docs say the secret keys that prove ownership can’t be recovered without a database backup, an identities backup or keys still held in a key manager, that a database backup has to be under 30 days old, and that a broken global synchronizer is fixed by the super validators rolling the network forward to a new one. Claims 23, 24 and 25.
The rest of this paragraph is our assessment and sits outside the graded answer. The fallback you have is the one you can name: who holds the keys, how old the last backup is, and which record governs when two disagree. Claims 29 and 30.
The fallback for a tokenised asset isn’t a second ledger. It’s the records and the keys you keep off the ledger.
We grade this answer announced. The two hour objective and the secondary site are confirmed, from the EU rules for clearing houses. The rest rests on what a body said: ESMA’s call for evidence, the FCA’s feedback statement, the industry responses and the operators’ own documentation. So the answer is graded announced. How we grade.
Taking this to a committee?
We turn the most requested answers into Briefs: the working behind the answer, as files you can edit. This answer stays free either way.
How to work out your own fallback, step by step
- Decide which model you’re in. If the token is a twin of an asset still held in custody or at a depository, ESMA says the asset stays safe in that chain and the outage stops you mobilising it. If the token is the asset, the disruption blocks transfer or use even though the asset is still valid. Claims 3 and 4.
- Find the governing record. In DTC’s description the official record of tokenized entitlements is its own off-chain system, and the securities stay registered to its nominee. Ask your operator which record it treats as authoritative when the chain and the books disagree. Claim 21.
- Name the critical dependencies. ESMA’s test is any component whose failure would stop collateral being received, recorded, verified, managed or used, and it names the platform itself and the logic governing collateral status. Claim 5.
- Check the keys and the backups, because that’s what recovery turns on. Canton’s docs say ownership can’t be proved again without a database backup, an identities backup or keys still in a key manager, and that a database backup has to be under 30 days old because the synchronizer, the service that orders and confirms transactions, prunes its history. Claims 23 and 24.
- Ask who restarts the network, not just your node. On Canton the super validators who operate the global synchronizer start a roll-forward upgrade to a new one, and each validator then runs the procedure on its own node. Claim 25.
- Test the scenarios the supervisor already has in mind: platform outage, loss or compromise of keys, and a reconciliation between token and underlying records that fails. Claim 6.
Exhibit 1
Two models, two fallbacks
Model 1
Token as a twin of a held asset
The asset stays in a custody or depository chain. ESMA says an outage can still stop you mobilising the collateral. Claim 3.
Trade-off. Your fallback is the custodial and depository process, which is also the route to using or selling the asset after a default. Claim 7.
Model 2
Token as the asset itself
ESMA says a disruption blocks transfer or use even where the asset remains valid, through nodes, keys, permissions or contract execution. Claim 4.
Trade-off. Your fallback is your keys and your backups. Canton’s docs say ownership can’t be proved again without one of them, and a database backup has to be under 30 days old. Claims 23 and 24.
Both models are ESMA’s framing in its call for evidence, so they’re graded announced. The Canton figures are from Canton’s own documentation.
The evidence, all 30 claims
Seven claims are confirmed, 21 claims are announced and two claims are speculated. The confirmed claims are binding EU texts: the clearing house business continuity rules in Delegated Regulation 153/2013, the pilot regime for market infrastructures built on distributed ledgers, a DORA recital, and IOSCO’s formal position in its final report. ESMA’s call for evidence and the FCA’s feedback statement are graded announced, because a consultation document records what the authority asked and said rather than what the law requires. The FIA, ISDA and GDF responses, DTC’s service and Canton’s documentation are announced for the same reason. We could not open DORA’s Articles 11 and 12 or the text of the operational risk principle for market infrastructures in this run, so neither appears as a claim.
Each claim has its own link, so you can cite it. Sources were opened on 20 November 2026. How we grade.
- 01Announced
ESMA says the key question for tokenised collateral is whether the arrangement delivers an operational resilience outcome at least as good as the one expected of the collateral arrangements central counterparties rely on today.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 02Announced
ESMA says that outcome includes well-defined fallback arrangements and a clear view of the operational dependencies in the collateral and settlement chain.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 03Announced
Where the token is a twin of an asset held in a custody or depository chain, ESMA says a disruption on the platform can still stop the collateral being moved or made available when it is needed, even though the asset itself is safe.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 04Announced
Where the token is the asset itself, ESMA says a disruption can block transfer or use even where the asset itself remains valid.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 05Announced
ESMA says it treats as a critical dependency any component whose failure would stop a central counterparty receiving, recording, verifying, managing or using collateral.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 06Announced
ESMA says the scenarios that need testing include a platform outage, loss or compromise of private keys, and a failed reconciliation between the token and the underlying records.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 07Announced
For the twin model ESMA says the ability to use or sell the asset after a default is likely to depend on processes inside custodial or depository systems, not on the ledger.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 08Announced
ESMA says separating assets through wallets, permissions or smart contracts may support segregation but might not amount to a legally enforceable attribution of those assets.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 09Announced
ESMA puts the question to the market of what testing, assurance including potential fallback arrangements, and scenario analysis would be needed before central counterparties rely on tokenised collateral more broadly.
ESMA: Call for evidence on CCP collateral tokenisation, 9 October 2026
- 10Confirmed
The EU pilot regime for market infrastructures built on distributed ledgers requires the operator’s technology arrangements to keep the service going and to stay transparent, available, reliable and secure.
- 11Confirmed
That regulation also makes the operator publish a transition strategy for winding down or stopping, and says it has to be ready to deploy in time.
- 12Confirmed
DORA’s recitals say the regulation lets financial entities set their own recovery time and recovery point objectives rather than fixing them in the text.
- 13Announced
The FCA says recent incidents have shown significant operational resilience risks in decentralised infrastructure.
FCA: FS26/1, feedback on the call for input on the future of tokenisation
- 14Announced
The FCA says a regulated firm can use third-party technology, including critical third parties, only if it carries the regulatory outcomes itself, operational resilience among them.
FCA: FS26/1, feedback on the call for input on the future of tokenisation
- 15Announced
IOSCO’s final report on tokenization says tokenised assets face operational vulnerabilities and risks unique to this infrastructure, including attacks on blockchain nodes and congestion in transaction processing.
IOSCO: Tokenization of Financial Assets, Final Report FR/17/25, November 2025
- 16Confirmed
IOSCO also says tokenisation should not in itself change whether the existing regulatory principles and frameworks apply.
IOSCO: Tokenization of Financial Assets, Final Report FR/17/25, November 2025
- 17Announced
The FSB says distributed ledger technology is relatively untested and could create operational fragilities.
FSB: The Financial Stability Implications of Tokenisation, 22 October 2024
- 18Announced
The FIA says a tokenised collateral framework should carry contingency arrangements that keep collateral reachable and transferable through platform outages, cyber incidents and other operational disruption.
- 19Announced
ISDA and GDF say that depending on the structure, the loss of a private key can be irreversible and can leave the asset unrecoverable for the user.
- 20Announced
ISDA and GDF say they want guidance from the regulators on operational resilience for the custody function, covering key management, data governance and outsourcing.
- 21Announced
DTC says that in the service it described to SEC staff its own off-chain system holds the official record of tokenized entitlements, and that the securities stay registered to DTC’s nominee.
SEC staff no-action letter to DTC on its tokenization services, 11 December 2025
- 22Announced
DTC says it would give tokenized entitlements no collateral value and no settlement value in its own risk management controls.
SEC staff no-action letter to DTC on its tokenization services, 11 December 2025
- 23Announced
Canton’s documentation says that without a database backup, an identities backup or keys still held in an external key manager, the participant secret keys that prove who owns an asset cannot be recovered.
- 24Announced
The same page says a database backup has to be less than 30 days old for the node to catch up, because of sequencer pruning. The sequencer is the part of the synchronizer that orders messages.
- 25Announced
Canton’s documentation says that if the global synchronizer breaks, the super validators who operate it start a roll-forward upgrade to a new one, and each validator then runs the procedure on its own node.
- 26Confirmed
EU rules for clearing houses make the business continuity policy identify the maximum acceptable time for which critical functions and systems may be unusable.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013, Articles 17, 19 and 20
- 27Confirmed
The same rules require a clearing house to test its policy against a two hour maximum recovery time objective.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013, Articles 17, 19 and 20
- 28Confirmed
They also require a secondary processing site whose geographical risk profile is distinct from that of the primary site.
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 153/2013, Articles 17, 19 and 20
- 29Speculated
Not confirmed: this is our own reading. The fallback that exists today is not a second ledger. It’s the records and the keys kept off the ledger, which is why ESMA’s twin model routes a default through custody and depository systems and DTC’s service keeps its own books as the official record.
Our assessment, from claims 03, 07 and 21
- 30Speculated
Not confirmed: this is our own reading. A firm that can’t say who holds its keys, how old its last backup is and which record governs if the two disagree has no fallback, whatever its platform contract says.
Our assessment, from claims 06, 08, 19, 23 and 24
Open points
- What DORA Articles 11 and 12 require in detail. The pages we tried returned only the recitals, so the page cites a recital and not the articles.
- Whether a recovery time objective applies to a tokenised collateral platform, and what it would be. The DORA recital leaves the objectives to the firm and we couldn’t open the articles.
- What happens to a client’s collateral if the platform operator itself fails. ESMA raises it as a risk and an open point and gives no answer.
- Whether any supervisor has tested a tokenised platform outage in practice. No source we opened reports one.
- What the FCA and Bank of England roadmap will require. FS26/1 sets no resilience requirement for tokenised activity.
- What Canton’s recovery procedure costs in practice: how long a roll-forward takes and what a validator loses. The docs give the steps, not the timings.
- Whether Delegated Regulation 153/2013 has been amended since 2013. We read the original text and didn’t open a consolidated version.
What would change this answer
ESMA’s conclusions after its call for evidence closes on 15 January 2027, the FCA and Bank of England tokenisation roadmap, a supervisory statement on tokenised collateral at clearing houses, a reported outage on a platform carrying real collateral, or a Canton governance decision that changes the recovery procedure would each change this answer.
Disclosure from Mac Sibbs
I hold $CC and $CNTN. The full disclosure is on the site.
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